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**STRATEGIC LEVEL LEADERSHIP: ARE THERE  
TWO LEVELS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE ARMY OR THREE?**

**A Monograph  
by  
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Purvis, Jr.  
Armor**



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
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# ABSTRACT

Strategic Leadership: Are There Two Levels of Leadership in The Army or Three? by LTC Joseph H. Purvis Jr. USA, 48 Pages.

There is an ongoing discussion within the Army's leadership doctrine community which focuses on the question; are there two levels of leadership or are there three?

Current leadership doctrine ( FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels ) identifies two levels of leadership; direct leadership at the tactical level of war with face to face contact between leader and led. Above the tactical level, indirect leadership is practiced.

Army Regulation 600-100 ( Army Leadership ) describes leadership as multi-dimensional with direct and indirect skills being applicable dependent upon the level of complexity in which the leader is working. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 ( Executive Leadership ) identifies three levels of leadership. The doctrine, regulation and pamphlet are thus at odds concerning levels of leadership. This paper attempts to determine if there are different requirements for levels two and three or above the level of direct leadership. Is there a top ( strategic ) level which should be so identified?

First, the careers of Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower will be reviewed using the descriptors for the levels of war as the criteria to judge leadership skill level differentiation. Military leadership literature will then be analyzed to determine skills required and leadership level differentiation when evaluated against the established criteria. Civilian leadership literature is also reviewed with the overall intent being to determine if there are level dependent skills or attributes.

The paper concludes that there are three levels of leadership and that the doctrine should be modified to reflect three distinct levels.

Strategic Level Leadership: Are There  
Two Levels of Leadership in The Army or Three?

by

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30 May 1989



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## Introduction

There is an ongoing discussion within the Army's leadership doctrine community which focuses on the question; are there two levels of leadership or are there three?

Current leadership doctrine ( FM 22-103 Leadership and Command at Senior Levels ) identifies two levels of leadership; direct leadership at the tactical level of war with face to face contact between the leader and led. Above the tactical level, indirect leadership is practiced. Indirect leadership involves intermediate organizational levels between the leader and the led and is associated with more complex organizations. (1) At the highest levels, conceptual skills and the identification of future requirements become critical. It is understood that the lines between direct and indirect are not always clear, but in reality indirect leadership is a blend of direct and indirect influence employed in varying contextual situations.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 ( Executive Leadership ) identifies three levels of leadership. The D.A. Pamphlet uses the terms direct, indirect and executive. (2) The third plane is at the unified command or strategic level with the first two terms representing the tactical and

operational levels of war. Army Regulation 600-100 (Army Leadership) recognizes multiple dimensions of leadership. (3) As leaders advance they will encounter organizations with greater complexity and interdependencies. The dimensions of leadership will vary from very direct at the face-to-face level of small groups to more indirect at the highest levels. The Regulation thus identifies two levels of leadership, direct and indirect, which are applied based upon the environment or context in which the leader is working.

The discussion then becomes, do the indirect skills and attributes in FM 22-103 and A.R. 600-100 adequately address the requirements at the highest level which we will term strategic? Should the doctrine list three levels instead of two?

This paper attempts to determine if there are different requirements for levels two and three or above the level of direct leadership. I will first look at the careers of three U.S. Army leaders: General Douglas MacArthur, General George C. Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower. These three were selected based upon the varied positions occupied and successes achieved over a time period.

Following the historical review of the three careers, we will review the military leadership literature. The intent is to determine what the literature describes as skills required

and attempt a differentiation in levels. Civilian leadership literature will then be reviewed with the same purpose. The focus of the overall effort will be to determine if there are level dependent skills or attributes.

The criteria for leadership level skills evaluation will be those which differentiate the broad divisions of activity in preparing for and conducting war. The broad divisions are military strategy, operational art and tactics. (4) Strategy is the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application of force or the threat of force. Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Tactics is the art by which corps and smaller units use potential combat power in engagements and battles. (5) Skills appropriate for success in combat at any of the levels of war seem to be correct leadership criteria for the nation's primary landpower force, the Army. Following the civilian literature analysis, the military education system will be briefly discussed as it pertains to leadership instruction or opportunities for learning in regards to strategic level needs. Are we offering the opportunity for leaders to prepare for service at the strategic level? Equally important to state at this point is that, although we concentrate on the leader, the

preparation of his senior staff is also an important aspect of the problem. As we will see, delegation is required as leaders move to levels of increased complexity and organizational levels; therefore, the strategic skills should be of interest and value to other than those who will become strategic leaders.

The paper will close with an analysis and a conclusion which will state whether there are two or three levels of leadership.

#### Historical

Edgar F. Puryear, in his book 12 Stars, states that there are qualities that, as he says, need to be a description of leadership and the requirements for success. He argues against lists which he feels will not enhance learning. The learning comes from study of the personalities of well known and proven leaders. (6) Although we will attempt some sort of identification of qualities further in the paper, this section will look at the careers of three leaders in an attempt to follow Mr Puryear's method.

The first is General MacArthur who served as Chief of Staff of the Army, Commander in Chief in the Far East and as the Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea.

General MacArthur's ties to the Army began with his father who was a well known career military officer. It therefore seems natural that MacArthur attended West Point graduating in 1903. MacArthur established a reputation at West Point for his strength of will and determination when as a plebe he suffered more than the normal hazing. His father's reputation and continued prominence in the press brought MacArthur specific attention from the upper classmen. Though receiving more and more intense hazing than the other plebes, he refused to break and treated the harassment as no different than that received by the other cadets. (7)

Despite the attention he drew and the severity of the hazing in the first year, MacArthur finished at the head of his class in 1903 with academic scores unequalled for years to come. Descriptors such as intelligence, willingness to accept responsibility, determination, hard work and a desire to excel are seen in the quotes cited by Puryear. (8)

MacArthur's career began with service in the Philippines. He then became an observer, with his father, of the Russo-Japanese War followed by a tour as the military aide to President Roosevelt. His early exposure to high levels in the Army and the international arena was due initially to his father who selected MacArthur as his aide as the elder MacArthur made an 8 month tour of the Pacific area. MacArthur's name and his credentials at West Point created

opportunities for further assignment on the General Staff. Here he served as an assistant to the Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood.

While serving on the General Staff, he became a favorite of the Secretary of War Newton D. Baker. Due to MacArthur's duty performance and the influence of Secretary Baker, MacArthur was assigned to the 42nd (Rainbow) Division being formed for deployment to France. He eventually became the Division's chief of staff followed by brigade and division command. Both as a staff officer and as a commander MacArthur was noted for his bravery and leadership from the front. (9)

MacArthur became the chief of staff of the Army in 1930 at the direction of President Herbert Hoover who cited his abilities and character in selecting MacArthur over several more senior generals. (10) MacArthur quickly established a rapport with the President and with Congress as he worked to increase the preparedness of the Army. Specific areas included military mobilization plans and the mobilization plans for industry in the event of war. The increased number of aircraft and the importance of air-ground coordination along with the ground mechanization focus foresaw the changing way of war. The depression in the United States caused a tension with MacArthur's efforts to increase the size of the Army and to modernize the force. MacArthur's stature, credibility and communicative skills made him a significant Army spokesman

before Congress where he became personally involved in efforts to raise the strength of the Army. He was successful in 1935 with legislation authorizing an increase of some 35,000 men and officers. (11)

MacArthur then became the Field Marshal of the Philippine Army even though he was 57 years old and at what could have been the end of a highly successful career. His responsibility was to build a Philippine Army with a focus on the defense of the islands against a Japanese invasion. His environment included a depressed economy, an underdeveloped infrastructure and the issues of organizing and training foreign soldiers in a highly politician government.

The Japanese subsequently invaded, forcing MacArthur to evacuate the Philippines and establish his headquarters in Australia. The Southwest Pacific Campaign followed with MacArthur's return to the Philippines and the eventual defeat of Japan.

Throughout his career MacArthur was noted for many characteristics. Prominently mentioned was his delegation of duties, personal courage, loyalty to his subordinates and self confidence. The landing at Inchon probably reflects all of these in a single event. Conceptual skills are also evident in MacArthur's service as the chief of staff and as the Southwest Pacific Commander.

Additionally, MacArthur was adept in dealing with other

services and other countries. Although the command relationships in the Pacific were divided along service lines due basically to the personalities of MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, MacArthur conducted a masterful campaign as he moved toward Japan with a allied force using US naval assets in many cases that did not directly come under his command. (12) He created an effective and usually cordial relationship with Admiral "Bull" Halsey the man caught in the middle between MacArthur and Nimitz. Halsey described his relationship with MacArthur as good, conducted in a give and take manner. Halsey reports that if there was a disagreement, he and MacArthur discussed the issue until one changed his mind with MacArthur never giving him an order contrary to the agreed upon action. (13)

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The rest of the MacArthur story includes the assignment as the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in Japan where he used his unlimited power to start the Japanese on the road to recovery and democracy after World War II. He also enjoyed initial successes in the Korean War as the United Nations Commander leading a Joint and Combined effort to defeat the North Koreans. This came to an end on April the 11th 1951 when President Truman relieved MacArthur of his command. (14)

## George C. Marshall

George C. Marshall began his military education at Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1897. He achieved the rank of Cadet First Captain having been ranked as the top cadet militarily in his first three years at VMI. (15) Marshall showed a determined personality early in his time at VMI.

A particular form of hazing included squatting over an upturned bayonet with the point touching the buttocks. During one such hazing, Marshall had been sick with a fever and due to his weakness fell cutting himself. He got up and left the area. He did not report the incident only reporting that he had cut himself. Also, he never mentioned the incident to any other cadets. He received no further hazing in his time at VMI.

After his acceptance into the Army upon graduation, Marshall was assigned to the infantry with duty in the Philippines. The duty was dull and boredom and low morale were problems among the soldiers. Marshall began programs both to train and to relieve the boredom as he instituted athletic competition, formal military competitive events and military drill .

Duty in the Philippines was followed by assignment to Fort Reno, Oklahoma and then to Fort Leavenworth. Marshall exhibited a dedication and penchant for hard work at Fort Leavenworth. He accordingly finished number one in his class at the end of the first year.

Marshall had impressed the Army Chief of Staff, J. Franklin Bell when Bell visited the students at Fort Leavenworth. Bell selected Marshall to work with the National Guard during the summer after his first year. (16) In this duty, Marshall gained experience as an instructor and in the movement of large forces. This was the only place at this time that large forces were trained due to the limited size and mission of the regular army.

In 1910, Marshall left Leavenworth and was assigned to various posts with significant amounts of time on temporary duty usually with the National Guard. He worked each summer with the National Guard conducting CPX's and in the maneuver of large forces throughout the country. Marshall enjoyed success and gained a reputation for his staff work and instructional capability with the Guard and in the 1913 active army large scale maneuvers in the Philippines.

World War I began with US involvement in the organizing and training of troops for service in France. Marshall was an aide to General Bell at this time who was the commander of the Eastern Department located in New York. From this position Marshall, now a captain, sailed to Europe as a staff officer in the 1st Division. He became in turn the G-3 and the chief of staff of the Division reaching Lieutenant Colonel in 1918.

Marshall later was the primary planner in the ST. Mihiel attack in August 1918 and the primary author of the plan for

the movement of over 500,000 men and associated supplies and equipment for the subsequent Meuse-Argonne offensive. (17)

Following duty with General Pershing and an assignment to China, Marshall was assigned to Fort Benning where he became known for his concern for people and instructional abilities. As Major John F. Morrison had been the influence at Fort Leavenworth for Marshall and the Army, Marshall now became the influence at Benning as he challenged and trained many of the future leaders of World War II. (18) He was described as demanding as an instructor and supervisor yet he practiced decentralization in execution allowing his subordinates to perform their jobs.

Marshall's career could be described as less than promising during the post war period. He had been reduced to the rank of major after the war in the force reductions and despite his successes at Fort Benning moved from there to a series of assignments that were not especially desirable.

In 1936 however, Marshall was promoted to Brigadier General and given command of a brigade at Vancouver Washington. Using the same approach he had established during such assignments as Fort Screven, Georgia and Moultrie, South Carolina; Marshall excelled with the Brigade and in his Civilian Conservation Corps responsibilities. Success in these duties brought assignment to Washington in the War Plans office as the Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans. In 1939 Marshall

became the Army Chief of Staff moving from brigadier general to general in one year.

The next six years is the period of the Selective Service Act, Mobilization of the National Guard and the training of an army for world war. Marshall's contributions appear to be obvious but it was his relationship with the world leaders that seems extraordinary for a military leader. Marshall was both an advisor and confidant to the president. President Roosevelt gave Marshall full access to his office and took Marshall on many of the strategic planning conferences involving the allies. Prime Minister Churchill viewed Marshall as the force behind the Americans through his will and determination. (19)

Marshall's desire to command was again thwarted by staff duty as had been the case in World War I. The issue was the selection of the commander for the European invasion, Overlord. The choices were Eisenhower or Marshall with the President choosing Eisenhower, according to several sources, because he did not want to lose Marshall's assistance in his dealings with congress and the allies. (20)

Marshall's characteristics included a selfless devotion to duty highlighted during the selection of the commander for Overlord. Though accompanying the President during the period the decision was being made, Marshall refused to make a case for himself. (21)

Additionally, personal courage, dedication, the ability to listen and learn from others, the ability to work with other services and the ability to work with congress appear in the descriptors of his service. Marshall maintained an agreeable and mutually respected relationship with the civilian leadership especially during the war years. As with MacArthur, Marshall established a vision of the future and had the personal strength to carry the vision through. The most discussed instance of vision and will during this period being Marshall's decision to field 90 divisions in the Army when many argued for over 200. The risks were great and the ramifications too complex to repair rapidly if the decision were in error. Marshall stayed with his decision confident in his rationale and in his knowledge of the overall capabilities of the country. (22)

Marshall's ability to serve at the strategic level is demonstrated by the World War II accomplishments and by his continued service after the war. As MacArthur was able to effectively function in a military or civilian capacity, Marshall also proved his breadth by serving as the Secretary of State in 1947 with the Marshall Plan and its successes. Additionally, he was recalled by the President in 1950 and served as the Secretary of Defense during the Korean War. In 1953 Marshall culminated his achievements by being the first military man to receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

## General Dwight D. Eisenhower

General Eisenhower was among the West Point class the stars fell on. That class had 58 members earn one or more stars. (23) Eisenhower, unlike MacArthur and Marshall, displayed no initial inclination or talent for a military way of life; especially not one that would find him as the commander of Overlord.

Eisenhower showed no unusual military promise as a cadet and what rank he attained he soon lost--usually for taking chances with the rules. His generally carefree attitude extended to his academic approach also. He was often seen reading a magazine rather than studying. (24)

He was extremely popular being pleasant, cheerful and considerate in his dealings with people. He, however, did show a fierce, competitive nature in all sports with a special interest in football. Eisenhower was also described as full of confidence and seemed to easily impart that confidence. (25) While being strong in his opinion, Eisenhower could always see both sides in a discussion.

Eisenhower first served at Fort Sam Houston, Texas and subsequently spent the World War I years training forces in the United States ruefully missing duty in the War. His ability as an instructor kept him out of the war as succeeding commanders

insisted that he remain in the instructor role. (26) As an aside it was during the post war period that Eisenhower and Colonel George Patton established a personal and professional relationship as they worked together on armor tactics and doctrine in their endeavor to change the role of the tank in combat.

His career was described as less than distinguished until the 1922-24 time period when he was serving under General Fox Conner in Panama. (27) Conner became a source of learning and served as Eisenhower's mentor proving helpful in his later career. With Conner's help, Eisenhower went to Leavenworth from Panama graduating first in his class in 1926. (27)

Following graduation, Eisenhower was appointed to the staff of General Pershing where he worked on a guide book to the actions of American forces in World War I. This was followed in 1933 by assignment to General MacArthur's staff as a personal military assistant when MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the Army. He subsequently accompanied MacArthur to the Philippines and then in 1939 was assigned to Fort Lewis as a forty-nine year old lieutenant colonel. He then commanded an infantry battalion followed by promotion to colonel and re-assignment to Fort Sam Houston as the chief of staff for Third Army.

The first significant activity as the chief of staff was the Louisiana Maneuvers which involved the mobilization,

movement and maneuver of over 420,000 troops. Eisenhower was singled out for the excellent planning by himself and the staff. (28) Among those impressed with Eisenhower's performance was General Mark Clark who would later recommend that Eisenhower become the Chief of War Plans Division. This position would involve Eisenhower at the highest levels of the government as the country prepared for war.

One week after Pearl Harbor Eisenhower was ordered to Washington by General Marshall, then Chief of Staff, as an assistant to General Gerow, head of the War Plans Division. (29) Eisenhower excelled at the work drawing strong marks from Marshall and Gerow for his perceptions in global strategic concepts. (30)

At Gerow's departure, Eisenhower became the Chief of War Plans and assistant Chief of Staff. He was promoted to Major General and in his duties frequently accompanied Marshall to the White House for meetings with President Roosevelt.

In June 1942, Eisenhower was appointed as the Commander of the European Theater of Operations, US Army (ETOUSA). At the appointment, Admiral King placed American naval forces in the British Isles under Eisenhower (this was an unusual and unilateral decision by King) as the top U.S. officer in Britain making ETOUSA a joint command.

Subsequent operations were the issue with the decision being should the first move by the allies be into Europe or

Africa. The decision was to go into Africa (Operation Torch) with Eisenhower as the commander. He was promoted to General and Commander of Allied Forces, Northwest Africa. Eisenhower was the supreme commander of the allied ground, air and naval forces demonstrating coordination and planning skills as he dealt with the sensitivities of the British and the French concerning future operations. At this same general time the Italian government surrendered giving Eisenhower a full range of issues with which to deal.

In January 1944 Eisenhower returned to London as the commander for Overlord, the invasion of the European Continent. The invasion was noted for the coordination, cooperation and trust among the allies and especially between the civilian leadership and Eisenhower. He was described as fair in his dealings, reflecting a clear mind while fully accepting responsibilities. Eisenhower was a soldier-coordinator-diplomat who was politically sensitive yet one who maintained his focus on the mission. (31) Montgomery called Eisenhower a military statesman and coordinator.

Eisenhower's characteristics included trust and confidence, selfless duty, dedicated study, visibility to soldiers, delegation/decentralization and will power.

Operational vision was also one of Eisenhower's preeminent as the planning for the Louisiana Maneuvers, Operations Torch and Overlord showed. Eisenhower saw the unity of the Overlord

alliance as the key to victory and as such he was willing to put American soldiers under British commanders and did so to make his point. During the Battle of the Bulge for example, he took forces from Bradley and placed them under Montgomery.

Additionally, he was willing to make personal sacrifices for the common good. It would have been easier to replace Montgomery than to have to deal with him. Yet, Eisenhower found a way to keep him in command and contributing as he did Patton when many thought Patton should be relieved. The end state of victory by the alliance was more important than near term difficulties.

Eisenhower's ability to serve at the strategic level was proven in World War II and in his later service to the country. He was Chief of Staff of the Army, the NATO Commander and after a period as president of a large corporation was elected President of the United States.

What can this survey of the careers of these men indicate about levels of leadership? Each officer performed successfully at the tactical level, commanding and serving as a staff officer. MacArthur served as a combat commander at brigade and division level. Marshall did not serve in command in combat but did move forces on the battlefield and convert potential combat power into victory in World War I. He also later commanded at brigade level at Vancouver. Eisenhower did not serve in combat at the tactical level but spent a great

deal of time training forces for tactical level combat and subsequently commanded a battalion.

Operational skills include employing forces to attain strategic goals. MacArthur displayed these skills as the Commander in Chief in the Far East with the campaigns in the Southwest Pacific. Marshall and Eisenhower also operated above the tactical level in a theater of war with the Meuse-Argonne and Torch operations respectively. Although requiring an understanding of the tactical environment, operational skills in the conduct of campaigns and major operations are at a different magnitude of complexity.

Strategic conditions include: establishing goals, assigning forces and imposing conditions on the use of force as the armed forces of nations and alliances are employed. Military ends, ways and means are combined to achieve national security policy objectives. As the chief of staff of the Army, MacArthur was successful at the national level as he worked with the President and Congress in preparing the military for war. His service as Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in Japan involved national policy objectives as did United Nations Commander responsibilities in the Korean War. When MacArthur overstepped his bounds by deciding policy instead of serving policy, the President relieved him. Marshall and Eisenhower also served national security objectives in their service. Marshall as chief of staff of the Army translated political

guidance into force structure and prioritized objectives in the war. Eisenhower, as the commander of Overlord, converted the guidance of the combined Chiefs of Staff into priorities, applying resources as he established conditions on the use of force.

There were different skills or attributes required at the operational and strategic levels. Employment of military forces involves a sensitivity to strategic goals as campaigns are designed and major operations are conducted. The thrust though is military action in a theater of war. Setting the fundamental conditions and providing assets to secure policy objectives are at a higher level of endeavor.

## Military Literature Review

The military review will address primarily doctrinal manuals. Other literature on military subjects but not in the manuals will be discussed in a following section.

The capstone manual is FM 100-1 (The Army). FM 100-1 begins with the national purpose and national power of the United States. Then the manual discusses the constitutional basics of independence, human freedoms, human dignity and human rights which provide three goals. The first is to preserve the independence and integrity of the United States. Secondly, is to preserve U.S. and allied vital interest abroad and thirdly to help shape the world so that freedom and democracy can flourish. The national purpose and constitutionally derived goals provide the basic objectives of the military forces. (32)

The Army's role in the military forces is primarily landpower, executed in coordination with the other military services. There are fundamental considerations that define the Army's role as a component of national power. The first listed by FM 100-1 is political purpose. War is a politically directed act, therefore the conduct of war is defined primarily by its political objectives. (33)

The manual further describes war as a national

undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest levels of policy making. (34) War can be at one or more of three levels; strategic, operational or tactical. FM 100-1 concludes with a chapter on the Profession of Arms in which the Army ethic and individual values are discussed. The Army ethic includes loyalty, duty, selfless service and integrity. Individual values are commitment, competence, candor and courage. (35) From the purpose statement for the Army we then require a doctrine.

Warfighting doctrine comes from FM 100-5 (Operations). That manual begins with a statement that the skill and courage of leaders is critical to win in the wide range of possible conflicts. The environment will certainly be joint and will probably be combined. (36) There is then a requirement for a strategic perspective, with sophisticated knowledge in the world wide arenas in which we may operate. Three essential components are required to meet this challenge; superb soldiers and leaders, sound doctrine and appropriate weapons and equipment. It further states that the human dimension of war will be decisive in the future as it has been in the past. (37)

Joint and combined operations, with the requirement to function in Unified Commands, Specified Commands or as part of a Joint Task Force will be the normal operational environment. Personalities and sensitivities of allied military and senior civilian are important realities in the strategic environment

of today's Army. The discussion then addresses strategic deployments in support of world wide missions which further reinforces the aspect of strategic perspectives for the Army's senior leadership.

The thrust implies that the senior or national level leader has the requirement to provide resources, ensure that training is appropriate for foreseen employment and that subordinate leaders are able to use initiative. A world wide vision that couples national objectives with resources is necessary.

The capstone training manual FM 25-100 (Training The Force), describes the mission of senior leaders as developing and communicating a clear vision. This is based on the mission, doctrine, history, threat, organizational strengths and weaknesses and the training environment. (33) The technique to be used is centralized planning with decentralized execution.

FM 22-100 ( Final Draft Military Leadership ) describes four requirements for military leadership: to lead in peace to be prepared for war, to develop individual leaders, to develop leadership teams and to decentralize. The orientation is on wartime, preventing the efficiencies of a peace time centralized system from adversely impacting on training and operations.

There are two modes of leadership; the direct and the indirect. (39) Direct leadership is at the junior officer level

conducted in a face to face environment. Indirect leadership involves subordinate level(s) between the leader and the led. The manual lists vision and building organizations as the indirect leader's responsibilities. This allows junior leaders the perspective to accomplish their tasks at the direct level.

Chapter 4 provides a discussion of what a leader should be. These attributes include; integrity, sense of values, courage, candor and commitment. Character is also discussed as an inner strength and the link between values and behavior. Character provides the means to do what one believes to be correct. (40)

Subsequent manuals in the hierarchy include FM 22-101 ( Counseling ), FM 22-102 ( Soldier Team Development ) and FM 22-103 ( Leadership and Command at Senior Levels ). While 22-101 and 22-102 are important in the leader development process, senior leadership is the focus here and we will therefore next address FM 22-103.

FM 22-103 ( Leadership and Command at Senior Levels ) provides the doctrinal framework and a statement of principles for leadership and command at senior levels. Using direct leadership skills as a base, the senior leader provides vision, communicative skills to project that vision and the will to generate the organizational leadership to win.

FM's 100-1 and 100-5 provide the imperatives and guidelines that establish the tactical and operational

leadership demands to meet our constitutional obligations. These manuals also provide the conceptual base from which requirements, characteristics and tasks of effective senior leadership and command flow. (41) FM 22-103 recognizes a need for a separate discussion of indirect leadership skills, concepts and fundamentals critical to organizational teams due to the complexity of leadership and command at senior levels. While maintaining a combat orientation there is still needed the ability to conceptualize events and create means to deal with future requirements. This vision is the key to all that must be accomplished. (42) The vision must include national and international perspectives due to the environment of complexity and interdependencies that the Army now serves.

The manual pictures vision as the hub of a wheel with five spokes that are the characteristics important to effective senior leadership and command. The characteristics are ethics, skills, command processes and aspects of the organization that are critical to execution. The fifth spoke is the challenge of senior leadership which is described in chapter 1 and illustrated through historical case studies in the final chapter.

The seniors leader's vision is based upon certain attributes, perspectives and imperatives. (43) Attributes describe what senior leaders are to their organizations while perspectives provide an experiential/educational basis or

foundation for the senior leader. Imperatives provide focus and sustain the organizational will to win. Implementation of the vision then becomes the requirement for the senior leader as the hub (vision) is supported by the spokes (characteristics).

Ethics are based in values, drawn from the constitutional system. Ethics build a moral foundation for action and result in a moral toughness. Skills include conceptual abilities, competencies and communicative abilities. The skills are not level dependent but include the continuum from the ability to listen at the leader-led level to coordination and persuasion skills at the joint and combined level.

Command processes are listed as follows; command, control, leadership and management. All are to be used together in an appropriate mix as they relate to the organization. Good organizations adapt quickly, respond to changing conditions, withstand stress, rebound from setbacks and know what they are doing. (44) The appropriate control processes recognize the components of organizations and the senior leader applies processes at the right time and place.

Senior leaders understand themselves, their organization and their mission. They then establish the objectives which, by using their leadership skills and appropriate command processes, are obtainable. Indirect skills will serve the senior leader no matter what the level, operational or

strategic. The context is what changes and not the skills.

Two other references will be briefly discussed. The first is Army Regulation 600-100 (Leadership). A.R. 600-100 describes multiple dimensions to leadership which require different skills and knowledges dependent upon the level at which the leader serves. (4b) The application of the dimension will vary along a continuum from a direct approach at the individual or small group level to the more indirect at higher organizational levels. Direct leadership is at the face to face level. Although generally associated with the tactical level of war, the skills are necessary for all Army leaders.

As leaders move up the organizational hierarchy, new and more sophisticated skills are needed due to the increased complexity and scope of responsibilities. The Regulation does not address levels but discusses skills as becoming increasingly complex in order to meet the increased organizational and scope of responsibility requirements as leaders progress in the Army's organizational chain. At the strategic level or in the strategic arena, conceptual and integrative abilities become more important. Such actions as the creation of organizational structures needed for the future, establishing the fundamental conditions for operations in war or those needed to deter war are involved at this level.

The second reference is Department of The Army Pamphlet 600-80 (Executive Leadership). The focus is at the three and

four star level with an intent to provide a philosophy based on level specific tasks. The pamphlet intends to provide a systems perspective of the Army founded on the experiences of Army officers at this level which will then provide a basis for a leader development process.

Executive level leadership is performed at the top one or two echelons of the Army working in an environment of complexity and multiple internal and external influences. (46) Future focus, vision and second order effects require the executive to have a systems approach to leadership. To reach this top level the leader progresses through two subordinate levels of leadership.

The first is direct leadership which is face to face influence and involves control of ones work. Indirect leadership is at the mid-level and builds on direct level skills. Involved is building teamwork and integrating functions. The pamphlet uses an overlapping arrangement of skills as levels blur with direct leadership being at the battalion level progressing to indirect/executive leadership at the Department of The Army/Field Army level. (47)

Major areas of work at the executive level include joint and combined lateral relationships, external relationships with society, relationships within the nation's defense forces and future capabilities planning. The executive leader employs all three levels of leadership while operating in this complex

environment of the national and international arena. The publications now need to be analyzed using as criteria the three levels of war.

The tactical level or direct leadership as the literature calls the tactical level, reflects consistency in each of the publications. Face to face, leader to led, direct communication skills are at the tactical level. Operational level descriptions in each publication are consistent while the terms are not.

FX 22-103 uses the term indirect and refers to vision and communicative skills to build the organization and create teamwork. Skills and attributes of the leader provide the focus and will power to succeed. A.R. 600-100 does not address levels of leadership but does describe skills that correspond to those necessary at the operational level. The thrust is team building, organizational climate and organizational structure. The leader must understand his organization and its capabilities. D.A. Pamphlet 600-80 addresses team building along with integrating functions for the indirect level leader. No level of war is identified but the orientation is on creating combat power using established (normally) command and control relationships. Employment of combat power through the use of well led and sound organizations generally supports the operational level requirements. The factors of campaign planning and the use of joint and combined operations is not

address leadership skill. The skill discussed in each of the publications could be described as subsuming these areas. We believe though, that there are specific issues in campaign planning, joint and combined operations which the leadership publications should address directly. FM 22-103 does describe the environment as global, joint and combined. There is also a reference to coordination and persuasion skills at the higher levels. The doctrine should be more pointed. The publications should address operational level of war leadership skills in a more direct manner.

Strategic level leadership is the next area to be analyzed. FM 22-103 addresses two levels of leadership and uses the concept that the indirect skills are applicable for strategic leaders. ~~What changes~~ at higher levels is the content or environment. A.R. 600-100 also discusses two levels and goes on to describe a strategic arena involved with the fundamental conditions for operations in war and the organizational structures to meet future requirements. Future conditions for operations in war or to deter war are the requirements for the highest level leader. D.A. Pamphlet 600-80 uses the term executive and identifies future capabilities planning and future requirements as the executive leaders responsibilities. These last two documents more directly relate to the concept of employing forces to secure policy objectives seen in the definition of strategy in FM

100-1. The approach in FM 22-103 is less clear when strategic level of war criteria are applied.

There is an ongoing effort by the Center for Army Leadership, CAC, and the Army War College to address the issue of strategic leadership. Currently there is a draft Chapter 3 (Strategic Leadership) to FM 22-103. The chapter includes discussions of national power, joint and combined operations and the military as an instrument of national policy. These conditions or this environment is the frame of reference for the strategic leader. The focus is contextual with the timeless principles of direct and indirect leadership being applicable. The difference is in the application of these principles. 41

The tactical and operational levels of war and associated leadership doctrine are matched well. The philosophy of FM 22-103 does support leadership requirements in general terms for the strategic level. There are more detailed or should be more detailed descriptions of skills and duties at this level than the manual currently lists however. Chapter 3 (Draft) to FM 22-103 provides the strategic conditions for the strategic level leader but does not identify a specific level. The more straightforward listing of three levels as in the pamphlet provides a more closely aligned relationship among the requirements at each level of war and associated level dependent leadership requirements. Additionally, a previous

edition of A.S. 200-100 provided a three level hierarchy of leadership that corresponded to the three levels of war leadership requirements in an excellent manner. These could serve as a model for the structure of leadership doctrine which matches leader requirements with war fighting skills. There should be three levels of leadership identified in the publications.

### Civilian Literature Applicability to The Military

With some exceptions, the civilian literature does not discuss levels of leadership. The basic thrust is that there are skills and attributes required at the top levels of business and the military. The skills and attributes align with those in FM 22-103 and with the top two levels discussed in the Regulation and D.A Pamphlet.

There are individual skills such as character, integrity, selfless duty and competency. There are also skills that relate to functions such as providing vision, goal setting and will power to the organization. The top leader must have a long range focus with a sensitivity to his environment and adapt his organization to changes in this environment.

Leadership is generally viewed in the literature as a skill which can be learned. There are some inborn aspects but

through education, training, and experience basic leadership skills can be learned.

We cannot evaluate the civilian literature using the levels of war criteria. We can establish that the skills and attributes required of senior leaders are consistent in the civilian literature and in those found in each of the levels of war definitions. Although they can not be ascribed as level dependent, the civilian literature reinforces the concepts of leadership seen throughout the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war.

## School Evaluation

Army Regulation 600-100 charges the Army War College with the mission of teaching leadership at the strategic level. The regulation also charges the Center For Army Leadership ( CAL ) at Fort Leavenworth, with the doctrine mission for the Army.

CAL publishes FM 22-103 ( Leadership and Command at Senior Levels ). FM 22-103 is the basis of the course one leadership instruction at the Army War College. A second document also used is the Department of The Army Pamphlet 600-80 ( Executive Leadership ).

The leadership course has an introductory three week phase to study the doctrine through the manuals/regulations, case studies and guest speakers. The thrust is strategic, reinforced throughout the year as students participate in war games and simulations which place them in various senior leadership positions. There is also a self assessment leadership paper through which students focus on their senior leadership philosophy. The strategic focus is being strengthened in Academic Year 90 with more opportunity to experience roles and positions. Using both FM 22-103 and D.A. Pamphlet 600-80 the students become grounded in the skills and attributes of senior leaders while gaining an appreciation for

the issues of national power and policy implementation through military strategy. (49)

The Army education program at the strategic level provides an appropriate opportunity for learning. Any proposed changes would be the addition, if feasible, of field trips to senior level headquarters. This is the only way to receive a true appreciation for the senior level.

### Analysis

The criteria of strategic, operational and tactical levels of war are consistent with the historical case studies used. Translating potential combat power into engagements and battles, employment of forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war and employing the armed forces to secure policy objectives are specific levels seen in the duties of the three officers studied. Individual skills and attributes of Army leaders are also reflected.

MacArthur, Marshall and Eisenhower displayed character from their earliest days in school. There was determination, trust and integrity with a desire to excel. All worked well at the direct level in their early assignments with soldiers; each showing a propensity to teach and exhibiting personal courage. MacArthur successfully served in combat as a brigade and

division commander. Marshall, though not commanding in combat, did excel at the tactical level in the Philippines as a lieutenant and later in a series of staff and unit assignments culminating in brigade command at Vancouver. Eisenhower served at the tactical level as he trained forces for combat in World War I and as a battalion commander at Fort Lewis.

Operational level capabilities were demonstrated by MacArthur in the Philippines prior to World War II and as the Far East Commander during the war. Marshall employed forces in a theater in World War I as the principle planner for the Meuse-Argonne operation. Eisenhower displayed the same employment skills in the Louisiana Maneuvers and Operation Torch. The numbers of forces involved, preparing plans for campaigns and operations, and the perspective of an entire theater are skills that go above the tactical level.

The employment of armed forces to secure policy objectives implies a national and international perspective that involves political aspects. The environment has a breadth which is greater than at the operational level. MacArthur initially worked at this level as the chief of staff as he attempted to rebuild the Army. Subsequently, he served as the Supreme Commander in Japan and as the United Nations Commander in the Korean War where armed forces were employed to secure policy objectives. Both in Japan and in Korea his responsibilities exceeded the employment of forces to attain strategic goals.

The fundamental conditions for operations and conditions for the use of forces were set by MacArthur. He then exceeded his responsibilities when his policy in Korea differed from that of the national command authority. He was no longer supporting policy objectives. Marshall also served as the Chief of Staff of the Army establishing force levels and imposing the conditions for the use of forces. He employed forces to secure policy objectives. Marshall's Germany first and direct invasion of the continent policies gave a direction for asset prioritization. Eisenhower, as the Overlord Commander and later as the chief of staff, moved beyond the operational level of Torch as he assigned assets for the European Theater, assigned priorities and translated the political guidance of the Allies into military operations.

The historical review supports three levels of leadership skills each with aspects greater in scope than preceding levels. Although each builds on the other as officers gained rank, each officer had to develop new skills for the next level of duty complexity. The employment of forces in a theater requires skills of campaign planning and execution. The provisioning of forces to support policy objectives is at a higher plane of perspective. This level involves national power and resource allocations.

The doctrinal review reflects consistency at the tactical and operational levels of leadership. The reference

publications, though using different terms, describe skills and attributes that meet the requirements of the tactical and operational levels of war respectively. The disconnect is at the strategic level.

FM 22-103 lists two levels of war and operates with the philosophy that the higher level, indirect, is applicable at the operational and strategic levels. While the indirect skills and attributes are included in the requirements for the strategic leader, there are resource allocation and future structure issues that ~~are not~~ in the discussion of indirect leadership. The strategic environment requires economic, diplomatic and political skills that the operational leader does not need. Army Regulation 600-100 supports the basic thrust of FM 22-103 as it applies the indirect skills throughout the senior dimensions of leadership. It addresses the skills of future requirement identification and the establishment of the conditions for operations in war associated with the strategic level of war but does so in the context of a continuum and not as a distinct level above the operational commander's requirements.

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80 identifies a third level of leadership which includes change management, resource allocation at national levels, building organizations for future requirements and maintaining the culture of the Army.

These coincide with those seen in the definition of military strategy.

Civilian literature does not provide insight into the question of levels. The literature does support the doctrinal listings of skills and attributes required at both lower and higher levels.

#### Conclusion

There is a strategic level of leadership that is different than the doctrine now describes in the two levels of direct and indirect leadership. What this level is called is unimportant as long as there is a recognition that at the strategic level there is an order of magnitude difference. The difference can arguably be framed in the context of environment as opposed to a level of leadership. However, the historical and doctrinal analysis indicates a stronger argument against this approach. There is a distinction at the strategic level that needs to be made and the doctrine should read accordingly.

The current revision to FM 22-103 written by CAL meets this requirement superbly in the description of the strategic environment of the senior leader. The one alteration I propose is a definition of a third level and then the standardization

of that terminology in the Army regulations, pamphlets and manuals.

The strategic environment is complex, involving national power and necessitating a national and international perspective. This perspective, combined with individual attributes such as trust, integrity and selfless duty ( all fall under the idea of character ), enables the strategic leader to work successfully as MacArthur, Marshall and Eisenhower were able, with national and international military and civilian leaders. For example, all three had the complete faith and trust of the president. This enabled them to employ armed forces to secure policy objectives as opposed to having both the policy and military strategy directed.

MacArthur, Marshall and Eisenhower provided vision, communicated that vision internally and externally and had the will power to pursue that vision. Strategic level leadership is unique and requires more than advanced leadership skills. There is a whole different environment which must be understood and which has distinct skills. The education and training system must support the opportunity for Army officers to learn how senior leaders operate and how associated staff officers support these leaders.

Learning to operate at the strategic level was a lifetime endeavor for these officers combining schooling, training, self study and guidance from sponsors. Each also had the

opportunity to serve at high levels, sometimes repeatedly, prior to assuming their strategic posts.

The Army must provide the doctrine, education and training that allows leaders to become strategic level leaders and staff officers. The doctrine appears generally sound, once a standardization of the three levels is achieved. Education programs also appear to be orienting on a strategic focus at the Army War College. We must now ensure that the right officers have the opportunity to serve and train at the strategic level. The leaders in our historical review received strategic abilities by their assignments, schooling and mentorship. Each level of leadership instruction in the Army should include these factors so that the system selects, designs, trains and schools the potential strategic leaders required by the Army in this time of a smaller, more interdependent world.

# ENDNOTES

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25. Ibid., p. 19.
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37. FM 100-5, Operations, p. 5.
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40. U. S. Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership, ( Washington D.C., 1983 ), p. 211.
41. Ibid., pp. 4-12.
42. FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, p. 1.
43. Ibid., p. 5.
44. Ibid., p. 9.
45. Ibid., p. 65.
46. A.R. 600-100, Army Leadership, p. 3.
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48. Ibid., p. 3.
49. FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, Chapter 3 ( Draft ).
50. Slides from the Leadership Department, Carlisle Barracks. The slides were used in a March 1989 decision briefing to the Commandant, Army War College. Colonel Jack Speedy ( Leadership Department Director ) also provided insight during a period of two months as this research was being conducted. Colonel Frederick

Timmerman, Director CAL, provided information and guidance on the entire education system and the integration of leadership doctrine into the system. Colonel Timmerman also served as a focal point for the literature surveys.

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